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Introduction 
Anyone glancing through the course reading lists at most universities, or browsing the 
bookshelves in an academic bookshop, might reasonably conclude that philosophy was 
something that had been written historically only by men. Its standard lists of great names, 
beginning with Plato and Aristotle, perhaps continuing with Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza and 
Locke, to Kant and Hegel, and into the last century with Russell, Wittgenstein and others, 
rarely contains a single woman. Indeed, many students often struggle to name even one 
woman philosopher before the mid-twentieth century and Simone de Beauvoir or Hannah 
Arendt. Yet women have been writing philosophy throughout this history. Not only has there 
been a surprising number of female philosophers but they often achieved considerable 
influence in their lifetimes. As well as Mary Wollstonecraft, others such as Hipparchia, 
Hypatia, Heloise d’Argenteuil, Hildergard von Bingen, Christine de Pizan, Gabrielle Suchon, 
Anne Conway, Margaret Cavendish, Emilie du Châtelet, Mary Astell, Catharine Macaulay, 
and Sophie de Grouchy, to name only a few, all had substantial and well-deserved reputations 
in their own time and engaged with contemporary debates at the highest level.
1
   
The reasons that underpin the omission of women from the history of philosophy are 
many and complex. The processes by which the discipline of philosophy as we now 
understand it, and of establishing what is often taken to be its canon, took place in the 
                                                     
1
 For an account of women’s extensive contribution to philosophy from Antiquity to the 
twentieth century see Mary Ellen Waithe’s (1987-1994), A History of Women Philosophers, 
four volumes. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.   
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
2
 These processes were controlled by men and there is no 
doubt that both sexism and ignorance have played a large part in obscuring women’s 
contribution. Since philosophy is a discipline that in some sense focuses on the application of 
reason, then where the prevailing belief is that women were “created rather to feel than 
reason”, as Wollstonecraft puts it, the idea of a woman philosopher just seemed wholly out of 
place.
3
 There are, however, more subtle and less direct reasons why women came to be 
marginalised. Jonathan Ree, for example, argues that the paradigm through which philosophy 
is understood shifted markedly in the nineteenth century following Kant’s transcendental 
revolution. Whereas earlier generations had accepted an eclectic and diverse range of 
influences and concerns, in the ‘post-Kantian canon’, only those whose work was considered 
to shed light on a narrowly-focused idea of the project of rational enquiry were accepted as 
‘true’ philosophers. 4 While many important earlier thinkers were subsequently overlooked, 
women, whose lives and education were conducted almost entirely outside of the academic 
establishment (where such abstract ideas were mostly discussed) were especially vulnerable 
and became almost invisible.
5
 Whatever the precise cause of their neglect, the situation is 
                                                     
2
 See Jonathan Ree (2002), “Women Philosophers and the Canon”, British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy, 10 (4), 641-52.  
3
 Mary Wollstonecraft (1992), A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, London: Penguin, p. 
155 
4
 “The only philosophers who would need to be remembered in the post-Kantian canon were 
those who could provide instructive illustrations of the errancy of pure reason”, Ree, 
“Women Philosophers”, p. 651.  
5
 This sometimes meant that they avoided signing their names to their work. As Marie-Jeanne 
Phlipon Roland wrote: “Never have I had the slightest temptation of becoming an author; 
 3 
now changing. Intensive work is now being done to recover and restore the historic 
contribution that women have made to the pursuit of philosophy.
6
 As the influence of 
feminist thinking has reshaped so much of academic philosophical enquiry, re-focusing its 
concerns beyond the confines of the post-Kantian project, so this has allowed us to reassess, 
as well as to rediscover, the considerable but forgotten input that women have made.   
At the forefront of this revival is Mary Wollstonecraft. As the author of A Vindication 
of the Rights of Woman, she already has a prominent place in many people’s minds as an 
inspirational early feminist. While this is has been an enormously influential book, it does not 
represent the whole of her thought. Wollstonecraft was a prolific writer whose interests 
                                                                                                                                                                     
very early, I saw that any woman who would earn this title lost much more than she gained. 
Men do not like her, and her own sex criticize her: if her works are bad, she is mocked, and 
quite rightly. If they are good, they are taken from her. If one is forced to recognize that she 
did produce the best part of it, her character, her morals, her behavior and her talents are 
dissected to the extent that her wit’s repute can be balanced against the weight given to her 
weaknesses.” Berville et Barriere (1827), Mémoires de Madame Roland, avec une notice sur 
sa vie, des notes et des éclaircissements historiques. Paris: Baudoin Frères, p. 178. 
6
 Lisa Shapiro, “The Place of Women in Early Modern Philosophy,” in Feminist Reflections 
on the History of Philosophy, ed. Lilli Alanen and Charlotte Witt, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), 
Jacqueline Broad and Karen Green, A History of Women’s Political Thought in Europe, 
1400–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), See also Green and 
Hagengruber’s introduction to a special issue of the Monist on women’s historical 
contribution to philosophy (“Introduction”, The Monist, 2015, 98, 1–6) as well as the papers 
they discuss.  
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covered subjects as diverse as education, politics, history, moral theory, philosophy, and 
religion. She was an activist, a novelist and a public intellectual who was fully engaged with 
the issues of her time. Wollstonecraft’s analysis of the nature and causes of women’s 
subjection is understandably seen as her outstanding contribution to the history of ideas. 
Nevertheless, this analysis is embedded within her own wider conceptual framework which 
she brought to bear on the issues she addressed. The premise of our volume is that this wider 
philosophy is deserving of serious study, no less than her feminist legacy.  
Wollstonecraft’s influence in her own time is undeniable. She often engaged with her 
contemporaries – such as Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, and Catharine Macaulay – and she 
participated in some of the philosophical debates that went on to shape the world – spending 
time, for example, in Paris during the Terror to document the effects of the revolution. 
Nevertheless, if it is true that women philosophers have been written out of history, it is 
strikingly so in her case. Moreover, her fall from grace happened almost immediately after 
her death when her husband, William Godwin, decided to publicise intimate details about her 
life including the fact that she had her first child out of wedlock, that she was in love with a 
married man, and that she twice attempted suicide. Wollstonecraft was immediately shunned 
as an immoral writer, and her Vindication of the Rights of Woman was not reprinted after 
1796, so that by the mid-nineteenth century, George Elliot tells us that it was ‘rather scarce’.7   
It would not be fair to say that Wollstonecraft made no impact after her death but we 
do have to work harder to find evidence of it. For example, in spite of her tarnished 
reputation, Wollstonecraft did have an influence on nineteenth century political philosophy. 
                                                     
7 George Eliot's review essay “Margaret Fuller and Mary Wollstonecraft” was first published 
in The Leader in 1855. 
 5 
Harriet Taylor had read her, so had John Stuart Mill, and the arguments of their Subjection of 
Women were profoundly influenced by the Vindication.
8 
It is striking, however, that neither 
refers to her. In “The Enfranchisement of Women”, published in the Westminster Review in 
July 1851, Taylor writes “Great thinkers indeed, at different times, from Plato to Condorcet, 
besides some of the most eminent names of the present age, have made emphatic protests in 
favour of the equality of women”. 9  Her failure to acknowledge Wollstonecraft, whose 
arguments she follows very closely, is perhaps not surprising. Claiming an alliance with Plato 
and Condorcet (even with the latter’s associations with the French Revolution) was a better 
tactic than referring to Wollstonecraft, the fallen woman.  
 Wollstonecraft remained mostly forgotten by the time of the first wave of feminism. 
By the latter part of the twentieth century as feminism entered its second wave, although her 
work was becoming more widely read, its proponents did not see her as a good role model, 
finding her too bourgeois, and a slave to notions of femininity. She was accused of ‘feminist 
                                                     
8 
There is evidence that Mill was at least made aware of Wollstonecraft, as Auguste Comte 
mentioned having read her to Mill in correspondence (Oscar Haac (1995), The 
Correspondence of John Stuart Mill and Auguste Compte, New Brunswick: Transaction, p. 
188). However, Mill says nothing in his reply that suggests he has or wishes to read the 
Vindication. Helen Taylor reports having read the Vindication as a teenager, and that the 
book was a gift from her mother. But this tells us nothing about when Harriett read it, nor 
whether she made anything of it philosophically. 
9
 Andrew Pyle (1995), The Subjection of Women: Contemporary Responses to John Stuart 
Mill. London: Continuum, p. 16 
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misogyny’, of measuring women's worth in masculine terms, and finding them wanting.10 
Part of this assessment was born, paradoxically, of her admiration for Rousseau, and her 
insistence that girls should be educated in the way that he had determined boys should be. For 
Wollstonecraft, treating women as differently abled than men, and failing to offer them the 
same means of self-improvement was the prime cause of gender inequality and of consequent 
social ills. But this could too easily be read as saying that women ought to be treated like men 
in order to be considered equally worthy members of society, and hence the accusations of 
misogyny. This charge was perhaps tied up with a more general suspicion by feminists of this 
period of eighteenth century, or Enlightenment, thinking which was seen to assert the pre-
eminence of abstract reason over emotion, where reason was understood as the preserve of 
men and was associated with concepts such as universalism and autonomy that privileged a 
male-centred view of the world and made the female perspective more difficult to articulate.
11
 
While Wollstonecraft is most definitely a product of this time, it is now widely accepted both 
that attitudes to reason and the emotions were far more diverse and nuanced than this 
                                                     
10
 Susan Gubar, (1994), “Feminist Misogyny: Mary Wollstonecraft and the Paradox of ‘It 
Takes One to Know One’” Feminist Studies 20 (3):453-73, p. 454. Thomas H. Ford (2009), 
“Mary Wollstonecraft and the Motherhood of Feminism” Women’s Studies Quarterly 37 
3&4, 189-205.  
11
 See, for example, Genevieve Lloyd (1984), The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in 
the Western World (London: Routledge), Joan Landes (1988), Women and the Public Sphere 
in the Age of the French Revolution, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press); Carole Pateman 
(1989), The Disorder of Women (Cambridge: Polity); Moira Gatens (1991), Feminism and 
Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality, (Cambridge: Polity).  
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simplified sketch allows, and that Wollstonecraft herself engaged confidently with its debates 
rather than merely being shaped by them.
12
 
Until very recently Wollstonecraft’s work was rarely read outside of gender studies 
and literature courses. This began to change in the 1990s. Virginia Sapiro’s excellent study of 
Wollstonecraft’s political theory, A Vindication of Political Virtue, was particularly 
influential in bringing her work to the attention of a more general audience of political 
scientists. The last two and a half decades have witnessed an intense scholarly attention on 
Wollstonecraft from many disciplines. Janet Todd’s biography in 2000 and Barbara Taylor’s 
examination of Wollstonecraft and the Feminist Imagination in 2003 were only two amongst 
several major books that increased awareness of Wollstonecraft’s significance as a thinker to 
be engaged with.
13
 Philosophers themselves, however, have come late to recognise the 
importance of Wollstonecraft within their own field. It is salutary to note, for example, that 
while there are a number of very good collections of essays written on Wollstonecraft, as far 
                                                     
12
 These re-evaluations were made possible in no small measure thanks to the pioneering 
work done by the earlier feminists such as those listed above. 
13
 Also of note is Wendy Gunther-Canada (2001), Rebel Writer: Mary Wollstonecraft and 
Enlightenment Politics, Northern Illinois University Press. More recent treatments include 
Susan Laird (2014), Mary Wollstonecraft, Philosophical Mother of Co-Education, London: 
Bloomsbury; and Lena Halldenius (2015), Mary Wollstonecraft and Feminist Republicanism. 
London: Pickering and Chatto. There has also been a wealth of journal articles written in the 
last ten years. Many are listed in the bibliography. 
 8 
as we are aware, ours is the first to position itself specifically as a philosophical collection 
directed at themes within that discipline.
14
 
 Just as Wollstonecraft had many interests and engaged in numerous pursuits, from 
writing fiction to taking part in political debate, so she can be studied from many 
perspectives. While philosophical examination of her work is not the only way to capture her 
thought, it remains very much under-researched, and we believe it will prove to be a very 
fruitful means of bringing out some of the subtleties, tensions, and innovations we find in her 
writing. In adopting this approach, however, we are not simply ‘opening up the philosophical 
canon’ as it currently exists and inserting a woman. Rather, just as the work of feminists have 
altered philosophy as a discipline, thereby enabling women like Wollstonecraft to be 
recognised for their philosophical contribution, so Wollstonecraft’s recognition will, we 
hope, further broaden our understanding of the role women have played in the history of 
philosophy.  
                                                     
14
 We do not mean to make too much of this claim. The superb Feminist Interpretations of 
Mary Wollstonecraft in the Re-reading the Canon series (1996, ed. Mary Falco, University 
Park, PA: University of Penn State Press), for example, orientates itself in the preface as a 
political science collection written by people in that field, while the Cambridge Companion 
to Mary Wollstonecraft (ed. Claudia Johnson, 2002, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
is in the Companions to Literature series. The division between disciplines such as 
philosophy, political science and literature is by no means rigid, of course. We are not 
making any specific claims about the content of these volumes so much as their positioning 
with relation to others working within those areas. Most of the contributors to this volume 
would identify as philosophers or are located in philosophy departments. 
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The Papers 
Our aim is to bring together a collection of essays that reflect the breadth of current leading 
philosophical research in Wollstonecraft’s work. In just one volume, of course, we cannot 
hope to present a comprehensive account of her overall philosophy from a single standpoint. 
Instead, our contributors write from a variety of perspectives that demonstrate something of 
the diverse interest that there is in her thought. Regrettably, there is a great deal that we have 
had to leave out. With any historical philosopher, those who study her face the dilemma of 
deciding to what extent they examine her work contextually, as it engages with her own 
intellectual environment, compared with treating her ideas as freestanding contributions to a 
larger conversation that spans the generations and that may be applied to current issues. Our 
authors strike the balance between these two aspirations at different points.  
The subjects addressed in this collection include the role played by Wollstonecraft’s 
understanding of love and respect in her arguments on inequality (Sylvana Tomaselli), the 
conceptual relationship between friendship and marriage (Nancy Kendrick), the place of the 
emotions in the development of civic virtue (Martina Reuter), the relational nature of her 
conception of independence (Catriona Mackenzie), the application of her views on rights and 
duties to children and animals (Eileen Hunt Botting), and the influence of the abolitionist 
movement on her views on women as property (Laura Brace). Five of the contributors focus 
on one particular aspect of Wollstonecraft’s political philosophy, namely her contribution to 
republican theory and, in particular, her use of its central ideal of freedom conceived of as the 
absence of domination or dependence. Philip Pettit gives a short introduction to 
Republicanism. This is followed by an examination of a specifically republican derivation of 
the concepts of rights in Wollstonecraft’s discourse as powers to act (Susan James). The third 
article shows how we may derive a view of representation from her views on freedom and 
independence (Lena Halldenius), while the fourth looks at the role of public reason in 
 10 
bringing about and maintaining individual and collective freedom (Alan Coffee). Sandrine 
Bergès then tackles Wollstonecraft’s attempt to resolve the tensions between her conceptions 
of the duties of a republican woman as mother and as citizen. The volume is conclude by an 
afterword that provides a perspective on the previous five papers, reminding us that despite 
its clear contemporary relevance, Wollstonecraft’s republicanism is very much a product of 
her times (Barbara Taylor).   
We briefly introduce the volume’s papers and themes below under three headings 
corresponding to Wollstonecraft’s influences, her social and political philosophy generally, 
and finally her republicanism specifically.  
1. Influences 
In-depth study of past philosophers often requires that we have some grasp of what their 
influences were. With male writers this task is often straightforward: we ask where they 
studied or who their mentors were, we look at records of their home libraries. But with 
writers like Wollstonecraft who had no access to formal higher education, and no family 
home in which she could house a large number of books, it is much harder. We must hunt for 
clues, such as in letters in which she comments on what she is currently reading, in the 
references she makes in her published works, and in the reviews she wrote for Johnson’s 
Analytical Review. We may also make certain deductions about her education. We can 
assume, for instance that she did not read Greek as this was not generally taught to middle 
class girls and since she makes no reference to learning it herself. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that, in one way or another, the classics did influence her.  
 Although Plato’s works were not translated into English until after her death, 
Wollstonecraft’s friend and mentor Richard Price was a noted Platonist and others with 
 11 
whom she engaged in debate were often trained classicists. Sylvana Tomaselli makes a 
convincing case for reading Wollstonecraft, not as an isolated crusader for equality, but as a 
writer who was very much part of her contemporary philosophical debates. While focussing 
on her intellectual relationships with Price and Burke, she makes it apparent that 
Wollstonecraft was in fact familiar with classical debates and arguments, tracing 
Wollstonecraft’s famous attack on servility in relationships to Plato’s Symposium. Tomaselli 
also suggests that the strong religious streak in Wollstonecraft’s works, and the complex 
relationship between human love and divine love, are also a product of the pervasive 
presence of Platonism in her circle. The idea that the abstract form of love is somehow more 
important than actual instances of love goes some way towards explaining some of her 
attitudes to marriage, but as Tomaselli argues, it is also significant in her rejection of social 
models based on servility.  
 If we can be confident that Wollstonecraft only knew Plato at second hand, there is at 
least a possibility that she had read some Aristotle. The Politics had been translated into 
French in the late Middle-Ages and there was at least one English translation (attributed to 
the poet John Donne). There is also some evidence that she had read the Politics, as she 
criticises Burke for misinterpreting part of it.
15
 Nancy Kendrick’s chapter offers an 
Aristotelian interpretation of Wollstonecraft’s conception of the virtues, and argues further 
that Wollstonecraft’s discussion of marriage is best understood in terms of Aristotle’s 
analysis of friendship. Kendrick shows that the capacity to develop Aristotelian virtue 
friendships has implications that go beyond marriage and into other kinds of relationships, 
such as the female friendships depicted in Wollstonecraft’s novels. Ultimately, Kendrick 
                                                     
15
 Nathalie .F. Taylor (2007), The Rights of Woman as Chimera: The Political Philosophy of 
Mary Wollstonecraft. New York and London: Routledge, p. 8. 
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argues, virtue friendship is the clue to women’s development as full moral agents, thereby 
showing that Wollstonecraft’s emphasis on marriage is not simply a worthwhile 
philosophical discussion in itself but an angle from which to approach more traditional 
questions in political philosophy.  
 Unlike Plato – who could only be read in Greek and perhaps Latin – and Aristotle – 
for whom only scarce and old translations could be found – the Stoics enjoyed a fair amount 
of popularity amongst the non-classically trained readers of the late eighteenth century. This 
was due in great part to Elizabeth Carter’s best-selling translation of Epictetus’ works into 
English. Though we have no direct evidence that Wollstonecraft had read this translation, it is 
not unlikely as one of the authors she regarded as a model, Catharine Macaulay, wrote 
approvingly of the Stoics, especially concerning their educational models. Martina Reuter 
examines Wollstonecraft’s position on the relationship between reason and virtue. She works 
through eighteenth century discussions of stoicism, in particular Jonathan Swift’s literary 
depiction of Stoic philosophy in Gulliver’s Travels, arguing that Wollstonecraft 
Wollstonecraft’s own analysis of the relationship between reason and the emotions (or 
passions), in which both are together necessary and sufficient for the development of virtue, 
shows a subtler take on Stoicism. 
2. Social and Political Philosophy 
Until relatively recently, Wollstonecraft was most often read within a liberal framework of 
either as one of its representatives or as rebelling against some of the strictures it imposes.
16
 
So, where an earlier generation of feminists was especially critical of liberalism for its 
                                                     
16
 Penny Weiss (2009), Canon Fodder: Historical Women Political Thinkers. University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 84-90. 
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perceived individualism, this concern was often read into Wollstonecraft’s work.17 At the 
same time, Wollstonecraft’s evident emphasis on both individual liberty and strong values of 
egalitarian community built on mutual trust and commitment seemed difficult to reconcile. 
This has led commentators such as Penny Weiss to conclude that Wollstonecraft was 
struggling to “redefine liberalism itself.18 Catriona Mackenzie’s contribution takes on this 
challenge. Drawing on the ideal of freedom as independence, she shows how Wollstonecraft 
prefigures current debates in the field of relational autonomy. Mackenzie maps 
Wollstonecraft’s analysis onto her own distinction in which two aspects to freedom are 
required, these being what she calls self-determination (the civic opportunity to determine the 
direction of one’s own life) and self-government (the independence of mind to exercise 
competent and authentic critical self-reflection). Entwined with these, Mackenzie identifies a 
critical third element of self-authorisation, through which individuals are able to regard 
themselves as agents capable of self-determination and self-government. As Wollstonecraft 
shows, self-authorisation cannot be had without the authorisation of others through having 
sufficient social standing. To bring this about would require more than a mere set of political 
                                                     
17
 For critical feminist accounts of liberalism that includes Wollstonecraft amongst its targets, 
see Alison Jaggar (1983), Feminist Polices and Human Nature. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and 
Littlefield; and Ruth Abbey (2009), “Back to the future: Marriage as Friendship in the 
Thought of Mary Wollstonecraft.” Hypatia, 14 (3): 78–95. The relationship between the 
different varieties of feminism and liberalism is, of course, a complex one. In recent years 
there has been a fruitful dialogue between these approaches (For a helpful collection, see 
Amy Baehr (2004), Varieties of Feminist Liberalism. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield).  
18
 Penny Weiss, Canon Fodder, p. 90.  
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rights, for example. What would be needed is a comprehensive reworking of the systems of 
norms and practices that have entrenched their position of inequality. 
 Eileen Hunt Botting takes on less widely discussed aspects of Wollstonecraft’s 
thought (children and animals) and present them in a contemporary context, arguing that we 
should look at Wollstonecraft’s discussion of children and animal’s rights in relationship not 
only to her contemporaries Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, but also to Onora O’Neill’s 
classification of duties. Her resulting analysis of Wollstonecraft’s discussion of rights and 
duties, and in particular of the indivisibility of sets of rights, casts light on recent debates in 
international human rights laws. This paper is a prime example of how discussing the themes 
presented in her works can have applications that reach beyond what Wollstonecraft 
originally intended.  
 If Wollstonecraft is partly ahead of her time in raising the issues of children and 
animals rights, references to slavery place her squarely within the republican debates of the 
eighteenth century. Political subjection, such as to an absolute monarch, was routinely 
described in the very same terms as the formal state of legal bondage, a position that had been 
adopted by advocates of women’s rights since at least Astell.19 This rhetoric is prominent in 
Wollstonecraft’s work and pervades her Vindication of the Rights of Woman and the claim 
that women are always slaves in virtue of their inevitable social subordination to men’s 
arbitrary power provides one of its central organising principles. Laura Brace explores this 
image, placing it in the context of the abolitionist debates of Wollstonecraft’s own time 
                                                     
19
 Astell famously asked why “if all men are born free, how is it that all women are born 
slaves?” (Patricia Springborg (ed.) (1996), “Reflections upon Marriage” in Astell: Political 
Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 18). 
 15 
concerning the legitimacy of owning property in a person. While slavery was viewed as a 
usurping of a person’s natural right to freedom, freedom in turn was understood to make 
moral demands which neither women nor chattel slaves were capable of fulfilling. Brace 
shows how Wollstonecraft dissolves the tension between these strands through a radical view 
of property as having the potential to corrupt the moral and rational capacities not just of the 
victims of domination but of the whole of bourgeois society.  
3. Republicanism 
A significant development in the study of Wollstonecraft in recent years has been the 
growing appreciation of the impact her republican commitments had on her thinking. 
Although still often described as undergoing a revival, interest in republicanism as a field of 
political inquiry has become well established over the last two decades or more. 
Nevertheless, in the context of Wollstonecraft studies, it remains something of a newcomer. 
What the last five papers included in this volume show is that the philosophical implications 
of reading Wollstonecraft through a republican lens turn out to be far-reaching. 
 There has been no shortage of women described as republicans, especially in the 
eighteenth century. Women as intellectually and politically diverse as Mary Astell, Catharine 
Macaulay, Olympe de Gouges, and Sophie de Grouchy have, in different ways, drawn on that 
tradition’s resources.20 Nevertheless, the pool of sources from which today’s neo-republican 
                                                     
20
 As a committed royalist and High Church Tory, Astell would of course be horrified to be 
classed alongside republicans. She does, however, make extensive appeal to the principle of 
freedom as independence from arbitrary power, or domination, and in that sense she can be 
said to draw on a republican resource (Patricia Springborg (2005), Mary Astell: Theorist of 
Freedom from Domination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). On the other writers 
 16 
theorists draw has been resolutely male. From Livy to Machiavelli, and Harrington to Price, 
men exclusively have provided the authoritative voices that help define the core republican 
concepts. An obvious consequence of this has been to deprive republican theory of an 
alternative internal perspective to challenge and broaden its principles and focus. This not 
only leaves republican thinking impoverished but by excluding their voices and perspectives, 
exposes marginalised and minority group members to the very domination that it seeks to 
reduce. Especially vulnerable, of course, have been women who for so long were 
systematically excluded from the benefits of citizenship, deprived of any effective voice, and 
placed in a state of dependence on men. Given this patriarchal history and its traditionally 
masculine imagery and language in which citizenship has been seen in terms of hardy, self-
reliant individuals capable of defending their country and unencumbered by the ties or cares 
of domestic life, it is not surprising that many feminists have been noticeably reticent about 
the republican project.
21
    
                                                                                                                                                                     
listed, see Karen Green, (2012) “Liberty and Virtue in Catherine Macaulay's Enlightenment 
Philosophy”. Intellectual History Review, 22 (3): 411-426; Sandrine Bergès (2015), “Sophie 
de Grouchy on the Cost of Domination in the Letters on Sympathy and Two Anonymous 
Articles in Le Républicain”. Monist, 98: 102-112; Karen Green discusses Olympe de Gouges 
in her (2015), Political Ideas of Enlightenment Women, chapter 9, “Anticipating and 
experiencing the Revolution in France”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, especially 
pp. 374-84). 
21
 See, for example, Anne Phillips (2000), “Feminism and Republicanism: Is this a Plausible 
Alliance?” Journal of Political Philosophy, 8 (2): 279–93 and Carole Pateman (2007), “Why 
Republicanism?” Basic Income Studies, 2 (2): 1–6. In recent years, there has been the 
beginning of a rapprochement between feminism and republicanism. In addition to several of 
 17 
 Wollstonecraft herself was forthright in her criticism of these patriarchal and 
masculinist characteristics. If they were essential aspects of republican theory, then it would 
indeed be difficult to count her amongst its number. But they are not. What is at stake when 
the term ‘republican’ is applied in this volume is not a set of practices or cultural values, but 
rather a structure of political argument based around a distinctive notion of what it means to 
be free. In today’s language, Republicans understand freedom as ‘non-domination’ following 
Philip Pettit, although most of the contributors here describe this as ‘independence’, 
following Wollstonecraft’s own use. Non-domination, or independence, represents a 
condition of full membership of a community in which one enjoys an equal protection against 
threats of domination understood as the arbitrary exercise of power. Domination, or 
dependence, is considered slavery. Since freedom is a fundamental moral and political 
concept, once its meaning has been established the effects will ripple through the way that  a 
range of other concepts and values are understood such as equality, virtue, the nature of 
rights, meaning of citizenship, and the relationship between individual and society.  
 The last five contributors of this volume all discuss aspects of historical 
republicanism. Philip Pettit outlines the philosophical idea of non-domination as it is used in 
present-day discourse, detailing some of the issues at stake and showing how that idea differs 
from the more widely-understood notion of freedom as an absence of intentional interference. 
Pettit’s contribution thus helps show how the discussions of Wollstonecraft as a republican 
thinker fit within more recent debates. Susan James then takes up the question of what 
Wollstonecraft understands by rights within a republican context. Although best known for 
her book entitled A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, rights themselves appear noticeably 
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absent from its actual concerns. James shows this appearance to be misleading by 
reconnecting Wollstonecraft with an older strand of republican tradition that views rights as 
effective powers to act. While this thought is prominent in the Dutch republicanism of 
Spinoza, for example, it has rarely if ever been discussed in Wollstonecraft whose heritage is 
typically seen as the English natural law republicans, such as Algernon Sidney and John 
Locke. James acknowledges the influence of both and works through the tensions that emerge 
as a result.  
 However they are defined, rights are always exercised within the context of a system 
of law. Republicans consider the law to be properly formulated, and therefore legitimate, only 
where it is required always to operate for the common good. Implicit in this concept is an 
idea of representation in which each of our interests can be said to be reflected and embodied 
in the structures and institutions of society as a whole. Wollstonecraft nowhere sets out a 
view of what she understands ‘representation’ to entail and so Lena Halldenius pieces her 
uses together. This reveals a critical position that is trenchantly opposed to defining a unified 
representative interest of a population based on the perspectives of its elite. Taking ‘political 
society as it is’, rather than in a state of idealised harmony, Wollstonecraft argues for an 
inclusive and egalitarian approach in which it is with the common people rather than the elite 
that we start. There is no assumed unity of interests but rather each group, including women 
and the working classes, add their perspective directly in the deliberations of government.  
There remains the question of how the interests, values, and ideas of all citizens can 
be heard and fairly considered. Alan Coffee shows that at least part of Wollstonecraft’s 
answer lies in the spirit in which public debate is conducted. We can only be sure of being 
represented adequately in a virtuous society, which at the minimum requires a collective 
capacity and commitment to act rationally according to the best reasons. Where individuals 
are not represented politically or in the laws and institutions of the society, they are 
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dependent. According to Wollstonecraft, dependence is a corrosive state that corrupts the 
virtue of both dominator and dominated alike. Once it gains a foothold, this corruption has a 
tendency to spread, weakening everyone’s freedom alike. Equal political representation for 
all, then, is not only a moral imperative but is also a practical one, being one of the necessary 
conditions of a free state.   
In her contribution, Sandrine Bergès draws links between Wollstonecraft’s thought 
and that of a French contemporary whom Wollstonecraft almost certainly did not read 
(although the two may have met), the republican thinker Sophie de Grouchy. Bergès argues 
that together, these writers help reconcile republican ideals of motherhood with political 
participation for women. Her contribution focuses on one aspect of female participation that 
historically has often been associated with women: caring for infants and children. Bergès 
shows that, while Wollstonecraft denies that women should be mothers in order to achieve 
citizenship (because citizenship is based on civic virtue and virtue is gender-neutral), she 
explicitly affirms that mothers who do not nurse do not deserve the title of citizen. Even on 
our best reading, it is not clear that these strands can be reconciled. Bergès looks for a 
solution in de Grouchy’s writings on sympathy, and particularly in the claim that all that is 
needed to give infants the moral impetus they need to become virtuous citizens is physical 
closeness with one individual, but not necessarily a mother. 
 In highlighting Wollstonecraft’s republican background, it is not the intention of any 
of the contributors to label Wollstonecraft, or to attempt to place artificial limits on her 
philosophy. In her paper, for example, Susan James shows Wollstonecraft to be drawing on 
both classical republican ideas and a natural law tradition characteristic of liberal thought in 
developing her own arguments about rights. While Barbara Taylor is appreciative of the 
benefits of reading Wollstonecraft in republican terms, she offers a reminder against the 
temptation to freeze any writer into any particular canon. Representing Wollstonecraft as a 
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‘modern philosopher’ with diverse and shifting interests inspired by numerous sources, 
Taylor highlights two other influences that should not be neglected: her womanhood and her 
strong religious commitment. Religion and republicanism are not easily separated in the 
eighteenth century, of course. Many of Wollstonecraft own dissenting sect, such as Richard 
Price, can rightly be regarded as Protestants and republicans in equal measure even if 
philosophers today have often tended to downplay the theological dimension. This much said, 
it is the unique appreciation of the female experience that Wollstonecraft brought to the male-
dominated debates she entered for which she is most celebrated. In aligning her with the 
masculinist tradition of republicanism, great care must be taken not to overshadow her 
feminist concerns, or the feminist tradition that was to follow. As Taylor reminds us, 
“feminism is not like other sorts of politics; it’s the personal made political, it’s politics with 
a sexual difference”, something she asks us to keep in mind “when we read Mary 
Wollstonecraft, and hear the echoes of her ideas in twenty-first century Britain”. 
 
